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SUPPLEMENT TO  
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1. During the last few months, Stalin has effected a number of fundamental changes both in the structure and in the personal composition of the most important governmental institutions of the USSR. The meaning of these changes is not yet clear in detail, but there can no longer be any doubt as to the general line they have taken: an ever greater concentration of power in the hands of Stalin himself is taking place. During the war he was already, to all intents and purposes, a dictator with unlimited powers, but at that time this was considered as a temporary state of affairs. It has now been made permanent. The USSR has now entered upon a period of personal dictatorship in form as well as in practice.

2. The most important of the recent innovations are:

(a) Measures which legally affirm Stalin's position as to the top "leader" (this title, borrowed from the Italo-German Fascist terminology, is now in universal use in official Soviet literature), who stands high above all other state functionaries, and in whose hands are concentrated the main threads of state, party, and military government.

(b) The transformation of almost all the members of the highest organization of the ruling party, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, men whose status was previously, formally at least, equal to Stalin's, into the latter's "substitutes" in various governmental functions, in other words, into Stalin's inferiors in the state hierarchy.

(c) The creation of a special body which has charge of all the country's military affairs - "The Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR" - which conducts all work connected with preparing the country for armed conflict with outside enemies. This ministry is headed by "Generalissimo" Stalin himself, who has chosen as his assistants the most brilliant military commanders of the war. The word "Defense" has been omitted from the name of the Ministry, and comments in the Soviet press make it clear that this omission is a deliberate one, and political in character; the tasks of the new ministry are not confined to preparing the country merely for defense.

(d) The complete alteration of the structure of the Organizational Bureau of the Communist Party, that most important body which directs all the inner work of the party and distributes the party forces (cadres); both in form and in fact Stalin is the head of this bureau.

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3. All these changes are the result of the complex processes of the country's development, and of the inner struggle within the Communist Party, which went on during the war years. Only an acquaintance with these interior processes will permit one to understand correctly the full meaning of the changes recently made by Stalin.
4. To understand present conditions in the USSR it is necessary first to see clearly the role played in the country by the Communist Party.
  - (a) The whole population of the country is divided into two unequal parts: members of the Communist Party on the one hand, and non-members on the other hand. The first group at the moment numbers about six million, in other words, approximately six percent of the adult population of the country. All power in the USSR is concentrated in the hands of this six percent: they alone have the right to nominate candidates for election; they have the monopoly of all political and generally ideological propaganda; they alone may occupy leading positions in the government, the courts and the army, may direct industrial enterprises, and so on.
  - (b) Non-party members, which means about 94% of the population, have no right and may occupy only subordinate positions. When occasionally a non-party member is elected to some post, this is done by the Communists themselves, who find it expedient to pretend that non-party members take part in running the country. Naturally, in such cases the Communists are careful to select persons who are wholly subservient to them. Non-party members who hold views different from those of the Communists have no chance whatever of influencing the government in any legal manner. They are not the subjects but the objects of power politics.
  - (c) All power in the USSR belongs to the Communist Party; the structure of that party however has nothing in common with political parties as they exist in the democratic countries of the West. During the decades of its dictatorial rule in the USSR, the All-Russian Communist Party has been transformed from a free association of men who held the same views into a complex hierarchical organization of men who hold leading positions and of candidates for such positions. Uniting as it does only an insignificant minority of the population of the country over which it holds plenipotentiary powers, the All-Russian Communist Party has banished every vestige of democracy from its organization in order to preserve its dictatorship. At the present time its structure is built up from above, on purely totalitarian principles: severe centralization, iron discipline, and scrupulously observed hierarchical gradation.
  - (d) All party policies are determined at the top, by a small group of leaders, and in actual fact by Stalin himself, with all the others acting in the capacity of advisers. The party tolerates no opposition to the decisions made by its heads. All its active members without exception swear by Stalin's every word. Yet an inner struggle within the party still goes on, but it uses channels other than those of political opposition.
5. Most important in the inner life of the party is the struggle which may be termed as the struggle between various social layers and strata within the country's new governing elite. In the ranks of the All-Russian Communist Party are united all those who occupy leading positions in the state governing mechanism. This mechanism is not only composed of a great many people, but is exceedingly complex as well, since all the branches of industry, culture, science, and public affairs in the USSR are governed by the state. Each of these branches has its own peculiarities and its special interests, which are inevitably reflected in the attitude of each separate group of "responsible workers" towards matters of general state policy. For this reason, during the very first years of its dictatorship, there appeared within the All-Russian Communist Party groupings built along occupational lines: "professionalists," or the leaders of the trade unions; "industrialists", or the men who stood at the head of various industrial enterprises; "military workers", or Communists who had specialized in the science of warfare, and so forth.

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6. The struggle between these groups was one of the pivots of the internecine party struggle within the last few decades Stalin settled it at last by his own methods: in the bloody purges of 1936-38 he liquidated all those who had taken a leading part in it, and established a party dictatorship within the party itself. All the members of the All-Russian Communist party may be divided into two basic groups; those who occupy important positions in some branch of the government on the one hand, and those who are engaged in organizing the proper functioning of the party itself on the other. At first the role of the latter had been merely auxiliary, but it gradually increased in importance, and after the trials of 1936-38 has overshadowed the other group. If the Communist Party as a whole is the master of the Russian State, the party machine has now become the master of the Communist Party. It is a dictatorship within a dictatorship.
7. The total result of these various processes of development was that, on the eve of the war, the mechanism of power in the USSR was built on the following scheme: governmental posts of any importance, in all branches, were packed by Communists, who were, however, merely carrying out the will of others; the real master of the State by now was the inner leadership of the Communist Party, which not only appointed all important government workers, but controlled them and gave them all necessary instructions.
8. The war produced material changes in this set-up. The country was fighting for its very existence, and events inevitably brought the army into the foreground. The specific gravity of the whole army staff increased correspondingly, together with the growth of its influence in the life both of the country and of the party.
9. On the eve of the war, the party machine had perhaps held more power over the army than over any other single group. The smashing of the staff collected by Tukhachevsky and his assistants had only recently taken place. The victims had been Communists versed in military science who, in order to render the army a more efficient instrument, had demanded for the Red Army a certain minimum of independence and freedom from political and police interference in its affairs on the part of party leaders. Some 50% to 70% of the upper army staff perished in that havoc, including all the best-trained younger men groomed for top positions. Only the "political marshals" of the type of Voroshilov, Budenny and Kulik escaped. These were men who knew relatively little of military matters, but who were wholly subservient to party leadership. From 1937 on it was these men who became full masters of the Red Army, which they altered to suit themselves, with the aid of a special group of party officials, the so-called "political commissars", who were the direct representatives of the party machine. It was they who were in charge of preparing the country for war during the crucial years of 1937-40; it was they who held top command in the army during the first stages of the war, and they who were responsible for the defeats of 1941-42.
10. The situation was saved by officers of the middle ranks. They were all Communists, and many had done years of party work (at that time non-Communists were permitted only in the lowest officer ranks). How these men felt became clear by the fall of 1941: they were all unanimously in favor both of replacing the useless "political marshals" and of abolishing the office of political commissars. These demands were dictated by the war situation itself. These men did not constitute a political opposition to the government in general, though there was undoubtedly a certain amount of opposition to the party machine, which, in order to preserve its dominant position within the country, attempted to limit the initiative of officers in the field by placing them under the control of political commissars. \*
11. This opposition had no clear-cut form and no leaders; but it represented the attitude of the great mass of officers. The outstanding representatives of the latter had a few sharp personal brush-ups with the "political marshals" (as for example, the conflict between Zhukov and Voroshilov in September-October of 1941 on the problem of organizing the defense of Leningrad, or the even severer conflict

\* The office of political commissar was created in April 1918, during the Civil War, and abolished in 1924. It was reinstituted in 1937, after the execution of Tukhachevsky. During the Finnish War it showed its worst side, and was therefore, abolished once more in August 1940. On July 16, 1941, it was revived for the third time.

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of the same period between commanding officers in the Crimea and Mekhlis, a special emissary of the Political Bureau). Rumor spread the tales of such conflicts, and the general opinion in the army was that the "political marshals" and the commissars were responsible for the defeats which the army had suffered.

12. The Communist Party was finding itself in a really dangerous situation, since dislike of political commissars was wide-spread among the Red Army soldiers as well. Here the struggle took other forms: the number of political commissars killed by their own men in time of battle increased. The non-party men, which the great majority of the rank-and-file soldiers were, found their dislike of the commissars intensified by their hatred of Communists in general.
13. In spite of the danger of the situation, the party machine did not give in without a struggle. The compromises which were gradually adopted follow a distinct pattern. The first step was given to the younger candidates for the office of marshal; dismissals of the "political commissars" began as early as September 1941. Then came a general amelioration of the position of officers, the creation of new medals, and the restitution of other privileges of the officer class. The office of political commissar was abolished only after the second series of severe defeats (on October 10, 1942). As for the rank and file soldiers, the government met their demands only by altering the content of its political propaganda: it abandoned all mention of "world revolution", and began to appeal exclusively to national and patriotic sentiments. Political and police control over the soldiers remained in force as before, while the officers' powers over them were even increased; thus, all officers from battalion commanders up had the right to transfer any soldier to a penal regiment without trial.
14. Clearly, the administration was willing to make compromises in order to reach an agreement with the army commanders, in other words, with the fighting officers, the overwhelming majority of whom were members of the Communist Party, but it granted nothing to the voiceless soldier masses. On the contrary, the administration expected active aid on the part of the officers in watching the army more closely than before.
15. The second line along which the struggle within the Communist Party developed, was that of personal antagonism between various representatives of the Party's leading organs. History shows that such antagonisms increase in importance in inverse ratio to the amount of democracy in any given government. In absolute monarchies, for example, in which the policy of a country is determined by a single person, the hidden struggle for influence upon that person frequently decides the fate of the country as a whole. The USSR has come very close to being ruled by one man, which is why the personal antagonism between Stalin's closest assistants is of such great importance.
16. It should be noted that, far from trying to wipe out such antagonisms, Stalin cleverly furthers and fosters them, and the various groupings which arise on such personal grounds. He has been systematically introducing into the leading positions in the party and government apparatus people whom he knows to be opposed and even hostile to each other. This is one of the peculiarities of his system of government, which he has borrowed from the ancient practice of the Oriental despots: personal enemies, like spiders placed in the same jar, watch each other jealously and report everything to their chief. True, the practical work of their departments may suffer because of this struggle, but on the other hand such a department can never become a center of opposition to the head ruler: as long as there is a personal conflict between heads of departments, they will need that ruler to arbitrate between them. We know from Stalin's Biography that he is extraordinarily clever in using this method, and that he frequently deliberately creates conflicts between his assistants.
17. During the recent period (since the purges of 1936-38), the central figure in all such personal antagonisms which affect the fundamental institutions of the USSR has been (and still is) G. F. Malenkov, who at the present moment is one of the most influential men in Stalin's immediate entourage.

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18. Still comparatively young (he was born in 1901 or 1902), Malenkov first won distinction by doing political work in the Red Army during the Civil War, at time when such work was indivisible from that of the Cheka. In 1925 he joined Stalin's private corps of secretaries, who were already conducting in great secrecy the collection of various materials which were to aid in Stalin's struggle for supreme power. Malenkov soon became one of the leading workers in this secretariat, and played an important back-stage role in organizing the purges of 1936-38. He remained officially merely a technical worker for the Central Committee of the Communist Party until 1939, but his hidden role had been of such importance that at the 18th Party Congress of March 1939 he was elected at once not only to the membership of the Party's Central Committee but also to that of its Organizational Bureau, one of whose secretaries he became, while in March 1941 he was a candidate to the Political Bureau, the highest political organ of the Communist Party. During the war he was Stalin's substitute both in the People's Commissariat and in the Committee for Defense. From 1939 he has held under the Central Committee the position of head of the Department of Cadres, in other words, he is the man who appoints members of the Communist Party to the highest positions open both in the government and in the party itself. At the present moment he is the real head of that party machine which, as has been pointed out above, is the actual master both of the party and of the state as a whole.
19. Malenkov is neither a statesman nor a theoretician. He never writes, and seldom makes speeches. His strength lies in his knowing how to organize and direct the vast and complex machine which is in charge of the many million newly-trained men destined to hold responsible positions in the Communist Party and in the state. His staff in the Department of Cadres is organized in precise correspondence to the government itself; to each commissariat (now ministry) of the latter corresponds a section or sub-section of Malenkov's own organization. Such a section not only carries out all the appointments in its particular ministry, but also collects all possible information regarding the personnel's private and public life. This information is concentrated in the hands of Malenkov, whose organization keeps a running file of personal dossiers of all the responsible employees of the state and the party. Here repose all their secrets, which Malenkov often uses to keep the people concerned under his thumb. He is the real "boss" of this organization...
20. Politically, of course, Malenkov always follows Stalin's lead, and takes pains to show himself to be one of his most ardent disciples. But where running his machine is concerned he has long ago manifested a tendency to go further than Stalin, even in following the latter's own policies. Foremost among the problems which have arisen lately in that field is the problem of the so-called "Old Bolsheviks".
21. It must be noted that, when he was training the men who were to assist him in his rise to power, Stalin instilled in them a contemptuous attitude towards the "old men" (i.e., those members of the Communist Party who had belonged to it in its underground days), presenting them as people who were good enough for the destruction of the old regime, but were too "soft" for constructive work, for the administration of the state once the revolution had conquered, because they were frightened by the extent of the terror necessary for the purpose. Such work could be carried out successfully only by men who attained psychological maturity already under the dictatorship, and were trained in the state and party machine...
22. It was these considerations which formed a basis for the annihilation of the "Old Bolsheviks" during the purges of 1936-38. However, Stalin not only did not destroy at that time a certain number of these "Old Bolsheviks", some of whom were among his closest collaborators, but did not even remove them from leading positions in the state and party government (it is enough to mention that even now over two-thirds of the members of the Political Bureau are "old men"). Malenkov considers this a mistake, sees it as unforgivable weakness, and does not conceal the fact that he is in favor of "rejuvenating" party leadership still further.

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23. Stalin has been restraining Malenkov in this matter, but restraining him with the smile which comes to his lips when he listens to proposals which seem to him essentially right, but premature. To people who know him well and Malenkov is of their number -- the smile signifies encouragement; "wait a while, the time will come".
24. During the war years Stalin, occupied by matters of state, was forced to relinquish the actual guidance of the organizational work of the party secretariat to Malenkov, although of course he received regular reports from the latter and consequently approved of it in the main. Malenkov received great freedom, which he immediately put to use in pushing out the hateful "old men". The ones who engaged his foremost interest were those members of the Organizational and Political Bureaus of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party who played an important part in running the party machine and who consequently were Malenkov's immediate competitors. These were members of the Central Committee's secretariat Zhdanov and Andreev, members of the Political Bureau Voroshilov and Kaganovich, and Mekhliss, who was a member of the Organizational Bureau. The last-named was not actually an "Old Bolshevik," but was closely connected with Kaganovich and played a tremendous role in the Central Committee in his capacity as director of party work in the Red Army.
25. Thus the struggle which developed during the war in and about the central institutions of the All-Russian Communist Party has been following two lines: on the one hand, the struggle of communist officers against the party machine, on the other, the struggle in the core of the party itself between its younger leaders and the "Old Bolsheviks" who still remained on their posts. Malenkov became a central figure in this struggle because he stood at the point where the two lines crossed. As the head of the party machine, he not merely defended the latter from the pressure of the "military", but did his best to utilize the conditions created by this pressure to oust his enemies in the party machine.
26. This was all the easier since the main attacks of the officers were directed against the very men who were Malenkov's opponents. For this there is a very simple explanation. When the war began, the Political Bureau wanted to conduct it according to the old recipes for revolutionary wars. In accordance with this intention, not only were the "political marshals", Voroshilov, Budenny and Timoshenko, placed in charge of various fronts, but special commissars of the Political Bureau with extraordinary plenipotentiary powers were sent to all the armies. The more responsible of these assignments were given to those members of the Political and Organizational Bureaus whose work in the state and party machines was not considered indispensable. Malenkov was not among them; he was needed in the central organization more than ever, for the training and guidance of replacements. The "Old Men", being persons of greatest experience, were naturally appointed to the most dangerous sectors. At best, this took them away from leadership in the party machine, which was getting out of their control. But almost inevitably they had to bear the brunt of the conflict with the communist officers: it was psychologically easier for the latter to shift the whole blame for the activity of the political commissars on those concrete people with whom they came in immediate contact, than on the system as a whole. The young communist officers who were fighting against the interference of the political commissars in army matters were inclined to regard the creators of the system, who sat in Moscow, not as those who were most at fault for having brought about the situation, but rather as supreme arbiters, who alone could decide in their quarrel with the political commissars.
27. This was so advantageous to Stalin personally that there can hardly be any doubt that Malenkov's game had Stalin's complete approval behind it. The result was that towards the end of the war all of the five above-named men were almost completely removed from the positions of power which they had held in the core of the party machine. Of the five secretaries of the Central Committee who were active in May, 1941, two, Zhdanov and Andreev, had dropped out by the end of the war. Actually all the work of the Committee fell upon Malenkov and his closest collaborator and adherent, Shcherbakov; the fifth secretary was Stalin himself.

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28. Of great significance was the dismissal of Mekhliss from the post of head of the Political Guidance of the Army (a department of the Central Committee which has charge of all political work in the army, all appointments of political commissars, etc.) Mekhliss ruined his war career in the Crimea, where his activities as commissar extraordinary of the political Bureau were evaluated by all the war experts as unconscious sabotage. But his appointment to the Crimea in the late fall of 1941 was already subsequent to his dismissal from his post as head of Political Guidance. He was removed from that position at the demand of Shcherbakov and Malenkov, who insisted that a Jew must not be in charge of political work in the army, lest that should provide a basis for increased anti-semitical propaganda. In general, the removal of Jews from important political positions under this pretext was carried out systematically during the war. This practice was begun by Shcherbakov, who held the position both of secretary of the Central Committee and of chief secretary of the Moscow Committee: as early as 1941-42 he engineered the dismissal of Jews from all positions of responsibility in the Moscow section of the Communist Party. Later, when he was appointed head of Political Guidance in the place of Mekhliss, Shcherbakov pursued his policy of ousting the Jews in the Red Army as well.
29. To replace the "old men" who he had elbowed aside, Malenkov gathered about him a close-knit group of young men whom he had trained himself and who were devoted to him. Outstanding among these, apart from Shcherbakov, who has already been mentioned, were G. F. Aleksandrov, who in 1941 was appointed head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, and Nikolai Shatalin, Malenkov's substitute number one in the Department of Cadres. Also closely connected with Malenkov is N. A. Voznesensky, candidate for membership in the Political Bureau and chairman of the State Planning Commission. Towards the end of the war it was these five men who were practically in charge of the whole work of the party machine. (Shcherbakov died in April, 1945, shortly before the war ended).
30. It must be noted that to Malenkov's group belonged three out of the five "young" members of the Political Bureau (those who, according to Stalin's definition cited above, attained maturity already under dictatorship and therefore do not hesitate to use mass terroristic measures): Malenkov himself, Shcherbakov, and Voznesensky. Of the younger members, only Khrushchev and Berya were outside it.
31. However, Khrushchev, who is the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, was practically in disgrace all through the war, not only because a general anti-Soviet attitude became apparent throughout the Ukraine (such a reaction took place practically wherever the Germans went), but because a similar attitude became very noticeable within the Communist Party of the Ukraine itself. Thus, for example, Khrushchev's substitute in the party secretariat, Burmistrenko, quite deliberately went over to the side of the Germans, and played an important part in organizing a pro-Hitlerite movement among the Ukrainians. It was largely for this reason that Khrushchev and his staff were not allowed to come to Moscow, but were settled in Saratov, where Khrushchev was obliged to carry out a ruthless check-up on the loyalty of all the Ukrainian Communists, a work which naturally had to be done under the control of Malenkov's special emissaries. All the publications of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party came under similar control, and during the war the "Pravda" two or three times published bitter criticism of the editors of the newspaper, "Radianska Ukraina", the chief publication of the Central Committee of the Ukraine. Under these conditions it will be seen that although Khrushchev never formally lost his rights as a member of the Political Bureau, he was in no position to take an active part in the struggle which was going on in Moscow.
32. Quite different is the case of Berya, whose influence increased tremendously during the years of the war.\* The story was current in Moscow that Malenkov used considerable effort to establish closer relations with Berya. It is

\* The news of his having fallen into disfavor, which appeared in the American press, is altogether false: true, he gave up the post of Minister of the Interior, but only in order to take over, as Stalin's substitute, the direction of all problems of domestic policy (the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of State, Security, the Ministry of Justice, and others.) At the present time Berya is one of Stalin's most trusted assistants, and belongs moreover to the narrow circle of Stalin's personal friends, along with Mikoyan and Voroshilov.



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known, for instance, that he committed several infractions of his own war-time rule of spending holidays at work in his office (the remark, "There are no holidays at the front" is ascribed to him), in order to make trips to Pushkino to see Berya, whose summer cottage is next to that of Stalin. The cautious Berya was very cordial, but refused to commit himself. He has shown no inclination to join Malenkov's camp.

33. Malenkov has had no greater success in his relations with Bulganin, who since the spring of 1944 has been spoken of in Moscow as a rising star. It is known that after having worked on Rokassovsky's Staff, during the preparation and execution of the spring offensive of 1944, Bulganin, at Stalin's order, prepared a long memorandum on the defects in the organization of the armed forces, and that Stalin liked the memorandum so much that he immediately carried out a series of suggestions contained in it, and had Bulganin transferred to his own Committee for Defense, entrusting to him at first the preparation of all measures which directly concerned the organization of the armed forces. Several months later, when Bulganin was officially appointed Stalin's substitute in the Committee for Defense, Stalin also gave him the power to sign some of the Committee's orders, thus showing him a degree of confidence which previously Malenkov alone had enjoyed (Malenkov had been empowered to scribble Stalin's initials on documents which concerned appointments of party members in the army). From that time on, Malenkov began, with his usual somewhat rude clumsiness, to court Bulganin, but the latter has shown himself even more restrained than Berya had been.
34. Thus Malenkov's attempt to establish close relations with all the younger members of the ruling clique has failed. Only those of them who had worked together with him in the central party organizations have come firmly into his orbit.
35. Such were the inner relationships within the leading institutions of the All-Russian Communist Party when the war ended.\* The balance was a precarious one. It was clear that it was only temporary, especially where the two basic problems of the war years were concerned, namely, the relations between the party machine and the Communist officers, and the role played by the Malenkovites within the party machine itself. The changes made by Stalin in recent months represent an attempt to attain a new and more stable equilibrium. To understand fully their significance, they must be seen not only against the wartime conditions, but also the conditions which existed in the Kremlin high command immediately before the war, or, more precisely, before Stalin took over the chairmanship of the Council of the People's Commissars.
36. In examining these changes one feature should be noted, which becomes apparent as soon as one attempts to follow the personal destinies of the members of the high staff of the Communist Party whom Stalin assembled immediately after the purges of 1936-38. No matter how Stalin has shifted them about since 1939, not a single member of this staff (which includes all the members of and candidates for membership to the Political and Organizational Bureaus) has been dropped since that date. There were a great many personal conflicts during the war, in some of which Stalin himself was actively involved - for example, his skirmishes with Voroshilov in 1941-43; yet no matter how bitter such conflicts become, they did not lead to the ostracism of any one of the members of the top staff. Even Mekhliss, who was so violently attacked in 1941-1942, whose court-martial was demanded by the army officers, has now been fully restored to his former pre-eminent position within the party, and is a member of the Organizational Bureau. He is no longer, however, head of Political Guidance, since the latter post involves activity not within the party but in the field of relations between the party machine and the army.
37. Of course, only Stalin personally could have so definitely put an end to all the frictions of wartime, and even he could only have done so by means of great perseverance. For the first time in his history he had assumed the role of an arbiter whose aim it is to preserve the unity of the ruling group. There is only one possible interpretation of his conduct: Stalin is seriously concerned in keeping and unifying the leading party workers who remain grouped

\* Shcherbakov's death in April, 1945, made no change in the balance of power, since he was replaced as secretary of the Moscow and Central Committees by Georgii Popov, one of Malenkov's most loyal men.

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about him, and wishes to instill both in them and in all responsible party workers in general the assurance that inter-party relations have been stabilized, and that purges of the old type are no longer a possibility.

38. He has, of course, not given up his right to shift or even dismiss people at will, but his recent conduct is a promise that such reprisals could be caused by administrative considerations alone, and would not exceed certain definite limits. Very indicative from this point of view is the case of Alexei E. Badayev, former deputy of the Fourth State Duma. A devoted Stalinist - they have been personally acquainted since 1913 - Badayev after the trials of 1936-38 was appointed chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Republic and member of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, was member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, and occupied a number of other honorary positions. In 1942 Badayev committed a grievous fault: sent to Outer Mongolia to take part in some sort of festivities, Badayev not only acquired there a number of valuable "gifts", not only went in for drunken bouts and debauches (they don't pay attention to such everyday trifles" in the USSR any more), but permitted himself to speak disparagingly in public of Stalin's diplomatic talents because of the latter's pact with Hitler. Such conduct on Badayev's part was characteristic of the man; he does not belong to the number of original thinkers, and if he pronounced such opinions (even when drunk) the inference must be that such opinions were commonplace among the ruling clique.
39. That, of course, could hardly serve Badayev as an excuse. He was at once recalled to Moscow, where the news of his adventures had been forwarded, to answer for his crimes. But the punishment meted out to him was amazingly mild: by party action, in other words, by Malenkov's orders, he was removed from his position Supreme Council, deprived of his title of President of the Russian Soviet Republic, and appointed director of the beer trust. This was, of course, done not only without a trial, but even without the permission of the Supreme Council, but what impressed the general public was not the infraction or the elementary laws of the constitution (advertised as "the most democratic in the world"), but the unusual mildness of the punishment: for such a crime a concentration camp, at the very least, was indicated, while here the party did not even bother to take away the valuable presents from outer Mongolia... Yet even this penalty was soon softened; recently Badayev was once more elected deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR, which is clearly a step towards complete amnesty.
40. Such mildness can be properly interpreted only as an indication of the desire, referred to above, to create the impression that relations between the leaders of the party have been stabilized, and that the days of ruthless reprisals towards guilty party leaders are over. This policy is all the more characteristic because it is being pursued against the background of unusually cruel and unusually wide-spread mass reprisals directed against the non-communist population literally millions of whom are being sent to Siberia and to the north in general. These are actually the two sides of the same policy: within the ruling elite of the country, in the ranks of the Communist party and especially at its top, the administration is trying to create unity by means of a sort of amnesty, while merciless terror is being employed against the popular masses.
41. The highest exponent of supreme power in the USSR before the war was the political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. Officially, according to the Party's statutes, the Political Bureau is in charge of the political work of the Communist Party. But since the latter, as has been pointed out above, is the master of the whole USSR, in actual practice the Political Bureau has not only been determining the country's general policies, but has served as the highest court for the decision of all practical questions of any importance as well. The official government - the Council of the People's Commissars - was composed of men appointed by the Political Bureau and was in fact only the executive organ which carried out the decisions of the Political Bureau. The relation between the Political Bureau and the Council may quite properly be compared to that between the owner of a private enterprise and the man whom he appoints as manager of that enterprise, with the only difference that this manager, liable to be cruelly punished for the least error, has no contract which might guarantee him a minimum of rights.

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42. Side by side with the Council of the People's Commissars, the executive unit of the Political Bureau in the government of the state, existed the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party which in practice was also an executive organ of the Political Bureau, but this time in the party machine. Formally the Organizational Bureau was not dependent on the Political Bureau, since it was elected at plenary sittings of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party for the purpose of "general guidance of the organizational work" of the party, but in actual practice it was completely subservient to the Political Bureau and directed its work along channels prescribed by the latter.
43. Thus the political Bureau was the highest body in the country's government, but a body which was not recognized in the country's official constitution, and which therefore had to act as a power behind the throne. This was characteristic of a basic contradiction in Soviet life: in actuality, all power was based on the recognition of the party's superiority over the state, but the party was not willing to give this principle official recognition. The resulting ambiguity may be illustrated by Stalin's personal position: until May 5, 1941, he occupied no post whatever in the government of the state, held no official ranks or titles, and was "only" Secretary General of the ruling party - yet actually he was the real "boss" of the country (at that time that was what the Russian communists called him among themselves), and one move of his finger sufficed not only to remove any given People's Commissar, but to send him to his death. In one way or another, this contradiction had to be resolved.
44. Shortly before Hitler's invasion of Russia, the situation underwent a change: Stalin emerged from the wings to the center of the stage and, on May 5, 1941, became chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars. During the war he was recognized as the sole dictator, but the war situation was a temporary one, and the government machine was not altered in accordance with Stalin's new role. This alteration is now taking place.
45. The present composition of the Political Bureau, confirmed by a plenum of the Central Committee in March 1946, is interesting primarily because it emphasizes Stalin's desire to stabilize the personal composition of the party's ruling clique: all the members of the Political Bureau who had been in office between 1939-45 have been re-elected, with the exception, of course, of the late Shcherbakov. The changes made within the Bureau are insignificant ones: two of the candidates - Berya and Malenkov - have been made active members; to replace them, two new candidates, Bulganin and Kosigin, have been elected. Since the death of another member of the Political Bureau, M. A. Kalinin, the Bureau is now composed of ten members: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov, Khrushchev, Berya and Malenkov, and four candidates for membership: Shvernik, Voznesensky, Bulganin and Kosigin. But the distribution of work among these members of the Political Bureau is so different from what it was before the war that the question arises what the functions of the Political Bureau are going to be in the nearest future.
46. The most notable change has taken place in the state government, more precisely in the Council of the People's Commissars, now transformed into a Council of Ministers. The number of the latter has been materially increased: the constitution which was ratified in 1937 lists only 39 commissariats, while the list presented by Stalin to the Supreme Council on March 19, 1946 named 53, and several new ministries have been added since. Yet what this rapid increase in the number of ministries shows is precisely that the men who head them will play no political role. At the moment, there is a special minister not only for each branch of industry of any importance, but frequently for one industry branch in one specific section only. The ministers are becoming more and more similar to directors of large industrial trusts, except that they are backed by, and may call upon, the state's powers of oppression.
47. Side by side with these technician-ministers, Stalin has created a new category of ministers: substitutes of the chairman. These are eight in all, four of whom are entrusted with special functions - Molotov, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovich, and four others, Berya, Andreev, Kosigin and Voroshilov, who have no definite assignment. These eight men have only one thing in common: they are all members of, or candidates for membership in, the Political Bureau. Under these circumstances, the fact that they have all been appointed substitutes can mean only

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one thing: side by side with his technician-ministers Stalin is creating the office of politician-ministers. He is actually going to have two councils of ministers: the multiple general cabinet (which includes up to 70 ministers alone) in which no questions of political importance will ever be decided - and a small political cabinet, which will consist of ministers who are also members of the Political Bureau.

48. There can be no doubt that this small cabinet will take over both part of the questions which were previously referred to the Political Bureau, and political surveillance over the work of the technician-ministers. Such surveillance existed before as well; it was carried out in the past by members of the Political Bureau, almost every one of whom was entrusted with watching a number of commissariats, whose heads had to submit reports to them. Formerly, however, such surveillance was carried out extra-constitutionally, behind the wings of the state's legal procedure; now, while still carried out by members of the Political Bureau, it would be quite legal, since they now would be substitutes of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and would be carrying out his instructions.
49. Thus relations will be normalized to a far greater degree than before. Stalin is quite deliberately choosing this precise moment for alterations in nomenclature, abolishing the Soviet of People's Commissars, around which have formed associations with the frequent shifts of the revolutionary epoch, and returning to the old term, Council of Ministers, which is associated in the public mind with ideas of stability. Stalin not only realizes himself that he is making fundamental changes, he wants the whole world to realize it. But one of the results of this normalization must be an appreciable curtailment of the role of the Political Bureau. First of all there can be no doubt that a considerable number of the problems which formerly were decided by the Pol.Bu will now be settled in the Council of Ministers, either by Stalin personally, or in a conference between him and his "substitutes".
50. Still more important is another point: Whereas before the members of the Political Bureau who were entrusted with the surveillance of the activity of various ministers previously held the status of equals, they will now be acting as Stalin's assistants, at his instructions and within the limits of the powers he may confer upon them. Stalin's extraordinary position has now received legal shape within the Political Bureau as well.
51. Of even greater importance is the second group of changes, which concern relations between the government and the army on the one hand, and between the Party and the army on the other. It has been pointed out above that during the war it was these relations which presented the greatest danger to the destinies of the "governing elite" of the Soviet state. During the war, the specific gravity of the officers increased in every respect. They now include dozens of marshals and several hundred generals, all of whom have rendered great service in battle and are covered with military glory. All of them are members of the Communist Party, but they are all rather backward in their knowledge of Communist doctrine; there was good reason for the order, issued to army organizations of the Communist Party as far back as 1943, not to insist upon acquaintance with the foundations of the party program when accepting new members or screening old ones. Whatever data is obtainable of the mental attitude of this particular class leads one to believe that there is no conscious opposition to the Soviet regime in their ranks, far less any organized opposition. But there is among them a great deal both of dissatisfaction with the general state of things and dislike of the party machine.
52. These difficulties, so sharply defined at the beginning of the war, were not resolved during its course. Their solution was one of the basic tasks which faced Stalin when he began to carry out his "reforms".
53. A return to the past, to those days when the party ruled the army through "political marshals" of the type of Voroshilov, is impossible. These marshals failed in the role of generals, and the army, with the experiences of the war behind it, will never recognize their authority, even should Stalin make every effort to bring them back into army affairs. But it is clear that Stalin intends to make no such attempt, and, having restored both Voroshilov and Budenny to political leadership, appears to have no desire to restore them to leadership in the army. That is all over and done with. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Press, when it mentions Voroshilov, does not refer to him as "marshal".

54. There is apparently no chance (at least in the nearest future) of another mass purge, of the type of 1936-38: the purges referred to were possible only because Stalin then felt that he was safe, for the time being, from a "great war", whereas right now, as all Soviet newspapers may testify, he is preparing for just such a war. Under these circumstances he may, of course, settle the hash of any given group of army officers, but will never undertake a widespread purge.
55. Such being the case, Stalin was forced to seek a solution to his problem in the only direction which remained open, that of an agreement with the new members of the army officer staff. The available information regarding the new Ministry of the Armed Forces of USSR and its first measures permits one to see along what lines Stalin expects such an agreement to develop.
56. This new ministry, at the head of which, with the title of Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR and at the same time that of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is Stalin himself, has been constructed by him as a most powerful governmental center which is virtually isolated from the rest of the administrative mechanism. Formerly there were two military commissariats, that of Defense and that of the Navy, whose heads were members of the Soviet of People's Commissars and held the same status as all its other members. Like the rest, they were subject to the general control. At the present time the only link between the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the officers on the one hand, and the government on the other, is Stalin himself. Naturally, under these circumstances there is no possibility of any outside interference in military affairs.
57. This isolation will naturally increase, rather than decrease, the importance of the armed forces and of their new ministry in the general life of the country. As his substitutes, Stalin has named some of the best commanders produced by the war (as, for example, the Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov). The powers of the ministry are extraordinarily great. The fact that Stalin personally takes part in all its projects is sufficient guarantee that it will have unlimited credit at its disposal. In his speech of February 23, 1946, Stalin emphasized that the Red Army must "ceaselessly and swiftly" develop military affairs and improve the theoretical training of the officers. Of this one may be sure: though the country as a whole should starve, the new ministry will have enough means to form new armies containing millions of men. Under the circumstances there can be no doubt that the new ministry is about to become a new and important center of executive power in the country: if the Organizational Bureau is such a center in the party machine, and the Council of Ministers in the state mechanism, the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR in conference with his substitutes will certainly form another such center in the mechanism of the army.
58. The unlimited possibilities of military construction, which would enable the army officers to satisfy their professional ambitions by providing the opportunity for a swift and brilliant military career, are the bait with which Stalin hopes to lure over to his side the more ambitious among the officers.
59. Stalin is willing to go quite far to meet these army groups half-way; the new military code, recently published in the Soviet Press (and expounded in the New York Times on June 20, 1946) shows that Stalin intends to assist certain groups of Soviet officers in their desire to attain a stable and officialized privileged position. Thus, the code introduces officers' honor courts, an institution once highly developed in the armies of monarchies, where it used to be one of the most important factors for breeding an anti-popular, narrow caste attitude among the officer class. This measure is quite in keeping with others (the re-introduction of orderlies, the prohibition to officers to carry large packages in the street, etc.) which Stalin introduced in 1942-43. Mr. Stalin is consciously trying to build up the "red officers" into a specially privileged group within the new Soviet elite. This side of Stalin's "reforming" activities in the army is all the more important because it fits in with his general policy of stabilizing the new Soviet elite. While affirming the general privileged position in the country of the ruling class as a whole, Stalin is also marking out within this class a specially privileged order of persons and groups who are of particular importance to him in governing the country.

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60. Reports of the new military code contain an indication of what Stalin expects to get from the new privileged officer class in return for its privileges: the code introduces far severer discipline in the army, and fixes increased penalties for the loss or damage to arms and military equipment for which single persons or detachments are responsible. The officers are expected to assist the government more effectively than before in holding the armed forces of the country in complete subjection.
61. The materials available at the present moment are insufficient to allow one to judge just how Stalin is going to resolve the second half of the army problem, namely, the relationship between the army and the party. All his recent statements, without exception, indicate that he is not in the least inclined to limit the role of the party as a gigantic mechanism for influencing the minds of the population. But there can already be no doubt that for the officers, who are being formed into a special privileged caste, some sort of adjustment will be made within the party, which will permit them both to remain party members and to hold courts of honor.
62. Measures which are now being carried out seem to indicate that party organizations in the army and navy have already been set free from the authority of the general party machine. This is attested to by the following facts: as his first substitute in the Ministry of the Armed Forces, Stalin has chosen Bulganin, who has been entrusted with "general business", which means primarily party political work in the army. Simultaneously Bulganin, who is a candidate for membership in the Political Bureau, has been also elected to the Organizational Bureau, where he has been placed at the head of that department of the central party machine which will direct party work in the army (this department was previously known as Political Guidance of the Red Army; it is not known exactly what it is called today). Thus Bulganin possesses full powers for the work he is doing, both along governmental and party lines. The extraordinary approval which Stalin has shown to Bulganin is guarantee enough that the latter will be completely independent of any other influence; no matter what policy he should pursue it will, essentially, be Stalin's policy, and will therefore necessarily be coordinated with Stalin's general effort to create a sharply delineated privileged caste of "red officers".
63. Stalin has carried out especially complex measures in reorganizing the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party - that department which directs the whole activity of the party machine. In March 1946 the Organizational Bureau was rebuilt completely, which involved not only radical changes in its staff, but an alteration of the very principles of its organization. It would be possible to bring out the full significance of these measures only by means of a detailed comparison of the biographical data of the new members of the Bureau and of their previous functions in the party machine. This would require a considerable digression. However, a basic outline of the meaning of these innovations may be indicated without such detailed analysis.
64. The Organizational Bureau, as prescribed by the last conference before the war (March, 1941) was actually a sub-section of the Political Bureau, to which organizational work was assigned: of its nine members, seven, in other words 77.8%, were members of and candidates for membership in the Political Bureau. Now the picture is quite different: while the total number of its members has been increased to 15, the number of members of the Political Bureau on its staff has been cut down to four, which represents only 26.7% of the total. Of equal importance is another point: in 1941 the majority (five) of its members were "old Bolsheviks", who had joined the Communist movement during its underground period; moreover, all five were members of the Political Bureau, in other words men of considerable importance. Of the fifteen members of the present-day Organizational Bureau only 2 (13.3%) belong to the category of "Old Men". All the rest are younger men, who joined the party during the period of revolution; moreover, the overwhelming majority of these - in fact, all but two: Bulganin and Mekhliss, both of whom have already been mentioned - belong to the category of party workers, and have been maneuvered into their present positions by Malenkov.

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65. The present-day composition of the Organizational Bureau would seem to indicate complete victory on the part of Malenkov, who has staffed it for the most part with his own candidates. Moreover, Malenkov himself has risen in party ranks: in the list of the members both of the Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee his name follows immediately upon Stalin's, which means that he is in fact the first secretary of the party. Yet it is certain that Malenkov is not pleased by his victory: at the same time he has been relieved of all his duties in the government of the state. During the war he was Stalin's substitute both in the Council of the People's Commissars and in the Committee for Defense, he was almost a dictator in the field or production of military aircraft, and so on. Now he has been removed from all these positions, and transferred exclusively to work within the party. There can be no doubt that this was done under the pretext that there was a need on the part of all available forces to specialize and concentrate on party work; but neither can there be any doubt that this marks the end of Stalin's remarkable favoritism of Malenkov which began just before the war and lasted during its early years. Now Malenkov is no longer the man closest to Stalin, but merely one of his four or five closest collaborators.
66. Besides, even in the Organizational Bureau Malenkov's victory is not as far-reaching as might appear at first glance. One of the members both of the Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat is Zhdanov, that same Zhdanov whom Malenkov had worked so hard during the war to oust from the Central Committee. True, Zhdanov has not been restored to his former position of head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, which he had occupied until late in 1941 or early in 1942 (that most important post is firmly held by Georgii F. Aleksandrov, one of Malenkov's closest assistants.) True, Zhdanov is only the second secretary of the Central Committee, which for him, who has served in the Secretariat since 1934, is a direct demotion. Nevertheless, he will be the second fully-empowered member of the Political Bureau to serve on the Organizational Bureau, another man who will be constantly taking part in the current work of the very center of the party machine, who will be informed of all its details and will have the right to know all its innermost secrets. From his experience of former years, Malenkov understands clearly the significance of Zhdanov's appointment: he will have at his side an enemy who is going to watch him, collect material about him, and report to Stalin on his activities. The function which in the past Malenkov himself has so often exercised in regard to others will not be exercised by Zhdanov in regard to Malenkov himself.
67. Another circumstance must be noted in this connection: Mekhliss, who seemed to have been ousted from the center of the party machine for good, has once again been made a member of the Organizational Bureau. This not only represents Stalin's departure from the campaign of "current anti-semitism" which was carried on in recent years by Malenkov and Shcherbakov, but means also that among Malenkov's closest collaborators there will be one more watchful enemy.
68. It will be seen that Malenkov's "victory" even within the party machine is not without important reservations. Actually, the chief, if not the only, victor in the struggle for power in the party machine which Malenkov has been waging all through the war is Stalin himself. It is his position which has been strengthened: in the new Organizational Bureau he is even more completely "boss" than he used to be in the old.
69. It is possible now to formulate conclusions. The two main lines of antagonism which were formed during the war in the government and party mechanisms have been utilized by Stalin to give shape and stability to his personal dictatorship. Instead of two organs of executive power, he now has three, each of which appears to have extensive powers. All contradictions between them, all frictions are now resolved by Stalin's personal authority. He alone correlates the activities of these three organizations.

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70. The political Bureau must certainly, both in form and in fact, lose a great part of its former importance. Of the fourteen men (members and candidates for membership) who now compose it, eight are Stalin's official assistants in the government of the state, one is his assistant in the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and two in the party machine. Only two of the members of the Political Bureau do not hold officially the position of Stalin's assistants. They are Shvernik, the new "president" of the USSR, and Khrushchev, the "viceroy" of the Political Bureau in the Ukraine.
71. The Political Bureau will not, of course, go out of existence, and in all probability there will be no formal changes made in its activities in the nearest future (Stalin is always extremely cautious in such matters.) But there can hardly be any doubt of the fact that its influence has entered upon a period of decline. It may be expected to progress further along that line, degenerating gradually into a conference between Stalin and his closest assistants in all the basic branches of the state government.
72. Under these conditions, an increasingly important role will undoubtedly be played by Stalin's personal secretariat, which will have to collect material relating both to the coordination of the three organs of executive power mentioned above, and to the preparation of central changes, both of a structural and personal character. There are already signs of such a growth. At the head of Stalin's personal secretariat at the present moment is Aleksandr Nikolaevich Poskrebishev (b. 1891) who is a member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. It is characteristic of Stalin to have engaged for this position not a representative of "the young", like Malenkov, but an "old man" and former underground worker, though with a rather brief record of such work. Stalin is insistently pushing him to the foreground: he has not only been elected to the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Republic, but has been placed at the head of the Council's Legislative Commission and made a member of the Constitutional Editing Committee.
73. It is clear that the new stage of development upon which the USSR entered in the moment when Stalin officially took the reins of government in his hands, is far from having reached its completion. It is impossible so far to predict the concrete forms which it may take in the future. But the direction of this new development is now clear: it is progressing towards the ever-greater strengthening of Stalin's personal regime. The preparation for war as a concrete possibility (and that this is being done may be seen from the highly instructive theoretical articles which determine the whole character of party propaganda) must further and hurry development in that very direction: in Stalin's opinion, in order to win a war, the country needs, first and foremost, complete unity of power which nothing and no one can disturb.

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